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MEAD IN THE TRENCHES
Adrian Vermeule*
My task is to introduce the George Washington Law Review’s annual survey of
the D.C. Circuit’s work. In past years introductory essays have worked with a wide-angle
lens, addressing large themes. I shall work in close-up, focusing on the D.C. Circuit’s
attempts to make sense of the most important administrative law decisions in many years:
United States v. Mead1, which constricted (to an uncertain degree) the scope of deference
afforded to agencies’ statutory interpretations. I shall suggest that the Circuit’s day-to-day
experience with Mead has been unfortunate, that its Mead-related work product is, in a
nontrivial number of cases, flawed or incoherent. But I shall also suggest that these
mistakes are traceable to the flaws, fallacies and confusions of the Mead decision itself.
The blame for the Mead muddle, then, lies with the Supreme Court.
So maybe there is a large theme here after all, about the relationship between the
Supreme Court and the nation’s premier court of appeals. The line officers and soldiers
who fought in the trenches at Verdun and the Somme were put in an untenable position
by generals who hadn’t sufficiently accounted for structural conditions of modern
warfare, who thought that exhorting the troops to go over the wire was good enough. So
too Mead’s attempt to develop a fine-grained jurisprudence of deference, sensitive to the
differences among the multiple policymaking instruments that agencies use—in short, its
exhortation to “tailor deference to variety”2—overlooks the increasing cognitive and
institutional load that the increasing complexity of Mead’s legal regime imposes on lower
courts. We might simply exhort the judges to do better, but I shall suggest we should take
their mistakes as reason to question the wisdom of the underlying orders they are striving
to execute.
A. What did the Court say?
The questions at issue in Mead were clear enough: should the two-step test for
deference articulated by Chevron U.S.A. v. NRDC3 apply to a letter ruling of the Customs
Service, and if not, should the less formal deference standard of Skidmore v. Swift & Co.4
apply instead? The Court’s nominal answers were also clear enough: No to the first
question, and Yes to the second. Yet the majority opinion is opaque even by Justice
Souter’s standards. With the help of subsequent commentary, we may piece together the
following account of the decision.5
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The Chevron opinion itself is best read as an attempt to simplify and clarify the
preexisting, and notoriously muddled, law of deference to agency interpretations.
Doctrinally, Chevron announced a straightforward set of ideas: Congress sometimes
intends to delegate lawmaking authority to agencies; such delegations may be express or
implied; statutory ambiguities and gaps will be taken as implied delegations of agency
authority to make law by interpreting the ambiguity in one direction or the other, or by
filling in the gap. From this follows the famous Chevron two-step, under which courts
first ask whether Congress has spoken clearly to the question at hand, and, if not, whether
the agency interpretation is reasonable. The first question asks whether there is an
ambiguity or a gap to be filled, the second asks whether the agency’s chosen
interpretation falls, permissibly, within the domain of the ambiguity, or impermissibly
outside it. On this view, the key innovation of Chevron is to create a global interpretive
presumption: ambiguities are, without more, taken to signify implicit delegations of
interpretive authority to the administering agency.
Mead reverses this global presumption. Rather than taking ambiguity to signify
delegation, Mead establishes that the default rule runs against delegation. Unless the
reviewing court affirmatively finds that Congress intended to delegate interpretive
authority to the particular agency at hand, in the particular statutory scheme at hand,
Chevron deference is not due and the Chevron two-step is not to be invoked. This need
not mean that, absent a delegation, the reviewing court decides the interpretive question
without regard to the agency’s views. The agency’s views are, under Skidmore, still
deserving of “respect,” due to the agency’s policy expertise and to the intrinsic
persuasiveness of its position. Note, however, that (both before and after Mead) there is a
set of interpretive questions as to which the agency’s views are irrelevant, except to the
extent that any litigant’s views are considered; an example is the interpretation of the
Administrative Procedure Act itself. So Mead establishes a finely-graded structure of
deference with three categories or tiers: Chevron deference, Skidmore deference, and no
deference. Justice Scalia’s dissenting view, by contrast, would have recognized only two
tiers: Chevron deference, and no deference at all.
Under what circumstances should the reviewing court find affirmative evidence of
congressional intent to delegate (thereby assigning the issue to category one, Chevron
deference, rather than category two, Skidmore deference)? One idea, pressed by some
academics and members of the administrative bar, would have been to say the following:
that Chevron deference is owed if, but only if, the agency possesses a statutory delegation
of rulemaking or formal adjudicative authority and has used that authority to produce the
interpretation at issue. Below I shall give some reasons for thinking that this approach
would in fact be unacceptable. Such a ruling would however, at least have had the virtue
of simplicity.
Mead, however, does not adopt this relatively simple approach. The opinion is
quite clear that although the agency’s authority to use, and actual use of, the relevant
procedural formats—formal rulemaking or adjudication and informal rulemaking—
should be taken as sufficient to evidence a congressional intent to delegate,6 it is not
6
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necessary to do so.7 The requisite delegatory intent may be found even as to agency
action outside these categories—including informal adjudication, interpretive or
procedural rules excepted from notice-and-comment obligations, and other varieties of
action—so long as “circumstances” evidence a delegatory intent. Mead is notoriously
vague about what circumstances count as evidence of such an intent, and what the
evidentiary weights of various circumstances are; one commentator gives no less than
three alternate readings of the opinion on this score.8 I shall indicate some of the relevant
considerations below. It is clear, however, that the Court was greatly concerned that
making procedural formality a necessary condition for Chevron deference, as well as a
sufficient condition, would be too crude an approach; it would fail adequately to “tailor
deference to variety,” here the variety of formats by which agencies generate
interpretations.
B. What did the D.C. Circuit hear?
So Mead creates a complex, finely-reticulated structure of analysis that courts
must apply at the preliminary stage of deciding what deference is due, before deciding
the ultimate merits of the interpretive question at hand. In the trenches of the D.C.
Circuit, however, Mead’s ambitious recasting of deference law has gone badly awry, for
reasons that expose deficiencies in the decision itself. Important cases purporting to apply
Mead have devolved into extensive, and likely inefficient, litigation over threshold
questions; have taken Mead, quite mistakenly, to license an all-things-considered de novo
judicial determination whether the agency’s interpretation is correct or incorrect; and
have taken Mead’s threshold inquiry into delegation to support a sort of generalized
hostility to delegated agency authority. Here I shall look at a few examples of Mead gone
wrong in the trenches—merely to introduce themes, and with no pretense of
comprehensiveness.
A preliminary caveat: The sample of post-Mead cases in the D.C. Circuit is small,
and in an appreciable fraction of those cases the panel recites and applies (some
reasonable approximation of) the Mead analysis, without significant controversy or
obvious error. Neither of those facts contradicts the thesis that the Circuit is struggling
with Mead. As to the former point, we may always hope that future panels will work out
the kinks; the claim here is simply that our best current information gives reason for
pessimism. As to the latter point, most cases in courts of nondiscretionary jurisdiction,
even courts of appeal, are uncontroversial; the base rate, with or without Mead, is that
most appellate decisions on administrative law are relatively unproblematic. Any
Supreme Court decision is, in this sense, marginal in the present; but important law for
the future is made, and unmade, at the margins.
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1. Federal Election Commission v. National Rifle Association of America
Federal Election Commission v. National Rifle Association of America9 posed,
inter alia, the question whether to afford Chevron deference to a formal advisory opinion
of the FEC. The opinion at issue barred corporations (including nonprofits such as the
NRA) from providing the paid services of its employees to its own segregated political
fund to work on congressional campaigns, where the value of the services was
subsequently reimbursed. The panel held that the opinion should receive Chevron
deference, primarily because the opinion had “legal effect” or “the force of law.”10 Three
features of the statutory scheme were said to produce this conclusion. First, the statute
established a “detailed framework for issuing advisory opinions.” Second, in issuing
advisory opinions, “the Commission fulfills its statutorily granted responsibility to
interpret the Act.” Third, “advisory opinions have binding legal effect on the
Commission,” creating safe harbors for parties who rely on them.11 Having found
Chevron deference to apply, the panel swiftly concluded that the FEC’s resolution of the
ultimate statutory question—whether the payments for employee time, reimbursed after
the fact, counted as an direct or indirect “advance” and thus as an illegal corporate
contribution—was a reasonable one under Chevron step two.
FEC v. NRAA is troubling in several respects. The FEC advisory opinion was not
issued pursuant to any of Mead’s safe harbor categories (formal adjudication or
rulemaking, or notice-and-comment rulemaking), so that Mead’s multifactor analysis
came into play. The consequence is that what we might call the predecision—the
analysis, under Mead, of whether the advisory opinion receives Chevron deference—is
far more elaborate than the ultimate statutory decision itself. The point here is not that the
panel misconstrues Mead or somehow gets the analysis wrong. Nor is it the simple,
though certainly correct, point that Mead’s refined attempt to “tailor deference to variety”
creates serious uncertainty for lower courts and litigants. The point, rather, is that
resolving that uncertainty produces highly inefficient meta-litigation that precedes and in
some respects hampers, rather than contributing to, the resolution of cases.
The costs of the elaborate predecision required by Mead will be highest whenever
the difference between Chevron deference and Skidmore deference will make no
difference to the resolution of the ultimate statutory question. FEC v. NRAA is just such a
case. Whether the agency’s interpretation is binding or merely persuasive, it is hard to
imagine that any sensible court would override an agency conclusion that the NRA’s
thinly-disguised contribution to its own political fund would not fall within the statutory
prohibition on “direct or indirect payment[s], . . . advance[s], . . . or any services, or
anything of value.”12 There is a view that the choice between Chevron deference and
Skidmore deference never matters, but that view is implausible. Cases such as FEC v.
NRAA, however, emphasize that the benefits of specifying the correct level of deference
may, on net and over the run of cases, be swamped by the costs of the meta-litigation
produced by that perfectionist approach.
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2. Motion Picture Ass’n of America v. FCC
A different cost of Mead’s perfectionist enterprise is evident in Motion Picture
Association of America v. Federal Communication Commission.13 At issue was an FCC
notice-and-comment rulemaking that mandated “video description” of television
programs—essentially audio narration of visual elements of the program’s action—for
the benefit of the visually impaired. The FCC relied on the grant of authority in the 1934
Communications Act; §1 provides that “this Act shall apply to all interstate and foreign
communication by wore or radio . . . and to all persons engaged within the United States
in such communication,”14 while other sections give the Commission sweeping authority
to make any rules and regulations needed to implement the Act’s provisions.15
The panel opinion drew from Mead the proposition that “the principal question is
whether Congress ‘delegated authority’ to the FCC to promulgate visual description
regulations.” With the question so defined, the panel proceeded to reject the FCC’s rule,
principally on the ground that §1 did not authorize it. Video description rules, the panel
said, are a prescription of programming content, and the terms of §1 “focus on the FCC’s
power to promote the accessibility and universality of transmission, not to regulate
program content.”16 The correct reading of §1 was originalist, and originalist at a
strikingly low level of generality. “Given the limited distribution of communications
facilities in 1934,” the reasoning went, “§1’s mandate to serve ‘all the people of the
United States’ is a reference to the geographic availability of service.”17
With all due respect, this is a series of missteps. A warning sign here is that the
panel never paused to ask the basic questions that Mead makes relevant to determining
whether Chevron deference applies; nor did it ask whether, if Chevron deference did not
apply, Skidmore deference supported the Commission’s view. The panel opinion entirely
collapses the predecisional inquiry mandated by Mead, which merely determines what
level of deference is due the agency, into the separate, substantive question whether the
agency possessed statutory authority for its action. The panel seems to have read Mead as
a sort of abstract instruction to lower courts to decide, on an all-things-considered basis,
and without affording any deference to agency views at all, whether Congress expressly
delegated to the agency the power to take the very action it did take; if not, the agency
loses.
This analysis is a caricature of Mead’s prescribed approach. First, and most
seriously, the panel seemed to assume that Mead requires an express delegation of agency
power; only on that assumption can we make sense of the panel’s claim that unless §1
supplied the requisite authority, the Commission must lose. Not one sentence in Mead,
however, supports this assumption. To the contrary, the central point of Mead is to
establish a series of indicators that reviewing courts must use to discern when, absent an
express delegation of authority authorizing the agency action in question, Congress
should nonetheless be taken to have implicitly delegated the relevant authority—as the
following passage makes clear:
13
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Congress . . . may not have expressly delegated authority or responsibility to
implement a particular provision or fill a particular gap. Yet it can still be
apparent from the agency’s generally conferred authority and other statutory
circumstances that Congress would expect the agency to be able to speak with the
force of law when it addresses ambiguity in the statute or fills a space in the
enacted law, even one about which Congress did not actually have an intent as to
a particular result.18
Mead, in other words, assumes that Chevron deference applies by virtue of an implied
delegation so long as (1) the agency is given rulemaking powers and (2) the rule at issue
is promulgated through the prescribed procedures, even if the agency’s express grants of
authority do not, standing alone, encompass the rule at issue.
Doesn’t all this simply mean that the panel misapplied Mead? Yes, to be sure; but
we also need to ask whether the panel’s blurry rendition of the decision may itself be a
predictable consequence of Mead’s infirmities. It is a strike against a higher-level
decision, like Mead, that it produces predictable error on lower-court panels, even though
perfect lower-court judges would not have committed the error. Lower-court judges are
predictably imperfect, so the differential effect of Supreme Court decisions on the
frequency and gravity of lower-court mistakes is a critical institutional variable, one that
ought not be assumed away by saying, simplemindedly, that mistakes can be avoided if
lower-court judges would simply get the cases right.
In the particular setting of the Motion Picture Associations case, we may
speculate that Mead’s revision of the Chevron default rule produced the sort of
overreaction that is, in hindsight at least, all too predictable. While Chevron adopted a
global presumption that statutory ambiguity would be taken as an implied delegation of
interpretive authority, Mead instead requires a case-specific inquiry into congressional
intent to delegate. The tempting mistake—and this was the panel’s mistake -- is to
assume that a case-specific inquiry must necessarily be a free-form, all-things-considered
judicial inquiry into whether the statutory text, read as if there were no agency in the
picture, authorizes the action at hand.
Mead, of course, avoided this pitfall by developing a series of proxies for
congressional intent that would structure the inquiry, but several features of the Court’s
enterprise combine to make it inevitable that lower courts will subordinate the proxies to
the ultimate question, treating the proxies as rules of thumb that merely inform the allthings-considered inquiry, rather than as mediating rules. One such factor is the sheer
complexity of the proxies; another is the obscurity of their connection to Congress’
delegatory intent. If lower-court judges find it hard, as do others, to understand what the
formality of procedure has to do with delegation—if, at the limit, they subscribe to the
view that congressional intent is fictional, and constructed by judicial decision
themselves19—then the (supposed) proxies will prove unstable.
Finally, and most importantly, there is the Court’s sneering dismissal of Justice
Scalia’s argument for an exclusive reliance on Chevron’s global, relatively rule-like
approach. The Court dismissed the global Chevron alternative by invoking the stock
18
19

Mead, 533 U.S. at 229
David J. Barron and Elena Kagan, Chevron’s Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 201 at 203.

7

argument that rules are overinclusive relative to their purposes; Justice Scalia’s approach,
which would afford Chevron deference even where the majority’s approach would find
no delegatory intent, failed sufficiently to “tailor deference to variety.” But of course the
Mead majority could have gone even farther than it did to “tailor deference to variety”;
instead it chose to develop procedural proxies that serve as sub-rules. The question is
why the Court chose to stop where it did on the continuum defined, at one end, by Justice
Scalia’s approach and at the other by a genuine totality-of-the-circumstances test. The
unfortunate, and almost surely unintended, implication of the Court’s sneer is that any
attempt to limit the range of considerations to less than all the relevant circumstances
amounts to an impermissible failure to capture congressional intent, even if the costs of
the all-things-considered search are much higher than the costs of a more structured
inquiry would be.
Taken together, these considerations suggest that Mead’s compromise position,
suspended uneasily between Chevron’s relatively clear global presumption and a genuine
totality-of-the-circumstances test, is intrinsically unstable. At the Supreme Court level, it
may well slip in one direction or another, either back towards Chevron’s former scope or
(more plausibly) in the other direction, towards an even soupier approach than the Mead
Court was willing to permit. At the lower court level, perhaps more importantly, it will
predictably produce decisions like the panel opinion in Motion Picture Associations,
decisions that are mistaken because they take Mead to license a free-form inquiry into
delegatory intent—an inquiry that, when answered, collapses into the merits question
whether the agency’s action was authorized.
3. Michigan v. EPA
One of the most notable post-Mead cases is Michigan v. Environmental
Protection Association.20 The panel invalidated EPA rules promulgated through noticeand-comment rulemaking, principally on the ground that EPA lacked statutory authority
to administer a federal operating permits program, under the Clean Air Act, on lands
whose status as “Indian country” has yet to be conclusively determined, one way or
another. The court buttressed its conclusion with a maxim, of dubious provenance, to the
effect that “[a]gency authority may not be lightly presumed.”21 The panel quoted prior
D.C. Circuit decisions saying that “[w]ere courts to presume a delegation of power absent
an express withholding of such power, agencies would enjoy virtually limitless
hegemony, a result plainly out of keeping with Chevron and quite likely with the
Constitution as well”—and also, the panel added, “out of keeping with Mead”.22 Relying,
in part, on this presumption against agency authority, the panel concluded that the critical
statutory grant of authority over “Indian country”—that is, “area[s] within the tribe’s
jurisdiction”—must be presumed not to grant EPA authority to operate a federal
permitting program in areas arguably subject to tribal authority, but whose precise status
has not yet been settled.
Here the panel is using Mead to revive a line of D.C. Circuit decisions from the
mid-1990s that read Chevron grudgingly, in barely implicit reliance on the dubious idea
20

268 F.3d 1075 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
Id. at 1082.
22
Id. at 1082 n.2.
21
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that the Constitution constrains Congress’ power to delegate authority to administrative
agencies by legislation.23 The point of these decisions was, as the passage previously
quoted suggests, to rebut the idea that Chevron deference is triggered whenever there is a
statutory gap or ambiguity—an idea that the Chevron opinion itself explicitly endorses.
These decisions undermine the core command of Chevron by invoking a nondelegation
canon, Chevron’s antithesis; they may even be seen as part of a more general enthusiasm
for the nondelegation doctrine on the part of a circuit that the Supreme Court recently
rebuked for attempting to revive that doctrine.24 It is true that the current Supreme Court
has revived nondelegation as a canon of statutory interpretation, but never as the sort of
general, free-floating presumption against agency authority found in the mid-1990s
decisions. Even the current high-water mark of statutory nondelegation jurisprudence, the
decision in FDA v. Brown & Williamson,25 says that the nondelegation canon is triggered
only where the “economic and political significance” of the issue at hand is so great as to
negate any inference of an implied congressional delegation—something that can hardly
be said of routine administrative-law issues at stake in Michigan v. EPA.
Mead’s emphasis on delegation, rightly understood, provides no better support for
such a free-floating nondelegation presumption. Mead’s emphasis on delegation is
entirely procedural, not substantive. Mead established a default rule that requires an
affirmative finding of delegatory intent in order to decide what level of deference is due.
But Mead carries no suggestion whatever that once the applicable level of deference has
been determined, and the ultimate question of statutory interpretation has been reached,
the statutory analysis is to be informed by a substantive presumption against agency
authority. The EPA’s use of notice-and-comment rulemaking should, under Mead, have
sufficed for Chevron deference on the ultimate question.
A straightforward criticism, then, would be that the Michigan v. EPA panel just
got the Mead analysis wrong. Here too, however, that reaction seems simpleminded.
Mead’s procedural, rather than substantive, use of a presumption against delegation is a
refined jurisprudential tool, and cases like Michigan v. EPA suggest that it may be too
refined, too precious, for day-to-day use in the trenches of administrative law. It is hardly
surprising, especially against the background of the circuit’s repeated flirtations with
different versions of the nondelegation doctrine, that the procedural use of a
nondelegation presumption would slip over into its substantive use. A task for the
Supreme Court will be to clarify, in the near future, the relationship between Mead, the
constitutional nondelegation doctrine, and interpretive nondelegation canons; on the
evidence of Michigan v. EPA, the task will not be an easy one.
C. Some generalizations
Even on the basis of the handful of cases examined here, it is not too early to offer
some tentative generalizations about the heavy burdens of implementing Mead. From the
Supreme Court’s relatively detached and abstract perspective, the global Chevron
alternative urged by Justice Scalia might have seemed unacceptably crude. Adding a
23
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layer of refinement to the deference analysis may well have seemed an obviously sensible
move, an easy way to “tailor deference to variety.” In the trenches, however, the theory
has worked out badly, producing a great deal of confusion and error. Why might this be
so?
1. Uncertainty, error and decision costs—The most obvious point, or set of
points, emerges from the literature on rules and standards.26 When and why might it be
best for high courts in a jurisdiction to use rules rather than standards? One type of
answer draws on principal-agent models, in which lower courts are taken as agents and
the high court as principal. Standards raise the costs to the principal of monitoring the
behavior of its agents, so a higher court may use rules in part to confine the discretion of
lower-court judges, who would otherwise exploit standards to implement their own
preferences.27
But rules might have other benefits, even where all lower-court judges attempt to
faithfully implement the high court’s instructions. The principal benefits are that rules
might, all else equal, reduce uncertainty in the legal system, reduce the cost to lower
courts of reaching decisions, and even reduce the rate and gravity of the errors that lower
courts make. Rules might reduce uncertainty for litigants, if they make planning easier;
they might reduce decision costs for lower courts, because they reduce the range of facts
and questions that are legally relevant. Most surprisingly, rules might sometimes reduce
error on the part of lower-court judges even though rules are overinclusive and
underinclusive, relative to the rules’ background justifications. If the cognitive load
imposed by open-ended standards is large, so that decisionmakers using such standards
will frequently (even in good faith) stray widely from the background justification, then
even the distortion that rules create might produce greater net accuracy than would a
comparable standard. As to all of these points there are many variables to be considered.
Along these line it is a valid, if rather obvious, objection to Mead that it
overvalues the decisional benefits of standards and undervalues the decisional benefits of
rules. In some passages the Mead Court seems to talk as though the mere existence of a
background goal or justification—here, the idea that deference is a function of
congressional intent—entails as a conceptual or logical matter that only an all-things
considered inquiry into that justification is legally permissible. This is nonsense, of
course; rules and standards are simply different, equally permissible devices for
structuring the decisionmaking environment. (Nor did the Mead Court itself follow
through on its claim; recall that the Mead Court, despite its sneer at Justice Scalia’s
relatively rule-like alternative, filters the congressional intent inquiry through rule-like
procedural categories designed to make the inquiry more tractable). Even short of that
nonsensical claim, however, it is equally a mistake for higher courts to adopt doctrinal
structures that require finely-tailored inquiries while ignoring or underestimating the
resultant decisional burdens. In what follows I will explore less obvious variations on this
theme. But it remains a forceful objection to Mead that it implements an ambitious, even
perfectionist search for precision in the legal norms governing agency deference,
precision whose benefits are, on the evidence to date, outweighed by the collateral costs.
26
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2. Predecision costs—In a variety of areas, law incurs not only first-order
decision costs, but what might be called predecision costs—costs of allocating decisions
between or among different jurisdictions, different decisionmakers, or different standards
of review by a given decisionmaker. Sometimes the legal system’s willingness to incur
predecision costs reaches grotesque extremes, as when parties litigate which forum’s
choice-of-law rule will determine which forum’s conflict-of-law rule will determine
which forum’s substantive law will determine the merits,28 or when judges or Justices
extensively debate constitutional standards of review that even academic experts find it
nigh-impossible to differentiate.29 Predecision costs inflict deadweight losses whenever,
ex post, the difference between alternative decisionmaking fora or standards of review
makes no difference.
Mead requires lower courts to incur extensive predecision costs. As FEC v.
NRAA illustrates, preliminary litigation over which standard of review applies to the
ultimate statutory questions may consume far more lawyer-time and judge-time, and
present many more complexities, than the statutory merits. Below I will canvass some
possible reforms of Mead that might reduce predecision costs, but none are wholly
satisfactory. And given that there is at least a substantial domain of cases that come out
the same way under either Chevron or Skidmore—I have argued that FEC v. NRAA is one
such—then the benefits of Mead’s fine-tuning of the applicable standards of review may
be swamped by the extra predecision costs it creates.
3. Are tiers of deference possible?— The principal effect of Mead is to add an
extra tier to the potentially applicable standards of judicial review: rejecting Justice
Scalia’s proposal for a regime containing deference (Chevron) or no deference, Mead
creates a regime with Chevron deference, Skidmore deference, and no deference. The
analysis of predecision costs given above suggests that Mead’s attempt to refine the
deference analysis is not cost-justified. A different, and more radical, critique suggests
that adding an extra tier of deference is, in a pragmatic sense, simply infeasible, given the
cognitive constraints under which real-world adjudication occurs. Judges can operate in a
mode of deference, and in a mode of independent decisionmaking, but more refined,
intermediate modes are either psychologically unattainable or nonexistent. As Judge
Posner puts it:
[Judicial] endorsement of multiple standards of review . . . greatly exaggerates the
utility of verbal differentiation. It reflects the lawyer's exaggerated faith in the
Word. I think I understand the difference between plenary review and deferential
review. In the former setting the appellate judge must say to himself, "The issue
has been given to me to decide, and while I shall pay due attention to what the
district judge (or other trier of fact) had to say on the question the ultimate
decisional responsibility is mine and must be exercised independently." In the
latter setting the appellate judge must say to himself, "The issue is not mine to
decide; because the district judge (or magistrate or administrative agency or
28
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whatever) has a better feel for it, or for other institutional reasons (such as to
discourage appeals), the responsibility for deciding has been given to him and I
must go along unless persuaded that he acted unreasonably, or in other words
unless I am clear in my mind that he erred." What is the intermediate position?
There is none . . . .30
If anything like this view is correct, of course, Mead’s attempted refinement of
Chevron is so much wasted paper. Its only effect will be to increase the frequency with
which judges operate in a nondeferential mode as opposed to a deferential one; and when
in the former mode judges will ignore the agency’s views entirely. The Motion Picture
Associations case is, plausibly, an example of this effect. The panel overlooks that it is
supposed to be deciding on the level of deference, collapses the Mead inquiry into the
merits, and decides the statutory question without affording the Federal Communications
Commission even the polite nod that is Skidmore deference.
4. Standards as Externalities—Finally, we may again invokes rules and standards
to analyze the relationship between the Supreme Court and the lower courts, although
with a different emphasis. We have seen that a principal might choose rules over
standards in order to minimize the costs of front-line decisionmaking by subordinate
agents. But the converse point is that the articulation of standards by the highest court in
a jurisdiction shifts decisionmaking costs onto lower courts. Those costs will not be truly
externalized if the jurisdiction’s high court will subsequently incur the costs of the
standard-based regime, perhaps in the form of later appeals from fact-specific rulings in
the courts below. But if the high court can avoid all or some of those subsequent costs,
for example by strategic use of discretionary certiorari jurisdiction, then a genuine
externalization is possible, in which case high courts may produce too many standardbased decisions, from the social point of view.
It is not hard to see Mead in this light. If the Court desires to cast its own
jurisprudence in a more fine-grained fashion than the global Chevron regime that Justice
Scalia urged, the costs of that jurisprudence will be felt most immediately and keenly by
the D.C. Circuit rather than the Court itself. To the extent that the Court can use its
discretionary certiorari jurisdiction to avoid entanglement in the fact-bound metalitigation
that Mead requires—and there is every reason to believe that it not only can do this, but
will—then the Court will have failed to account for the full social costs of its preferred
legal regime.
D. Reforms?
So far I have been uniformly critical; I will conclude by canvassing some
constructive proposals for reforming Mead to alleviate its collateral costs and to lighten
the burden on the D.C. Circuit and other lower courts. (I will proceed roughly in reverse
order of importance, from small proposals to large ones). The critical note persists,
however, because no alternative for reforming Mead appears as promising as the largest
possible reform—abandoning Mead as a failed experiment, adopting instead the simple
rule-bound Chevron approach urged by Justice Scalia’s dissent.

30

U.S. v. McKinney, 919 F.2d 405, 423 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J., concurring).
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1. Peeking at the merits—A small but useful tool that judges may use to minimize
predecision costs in many settings is to peek at the merits. Judges sometimes pretermit
complicated analysis of threshold requirements of procedure and jurisdiction in this way,
and a similar technique might be useful in deference cases after Mead. In cases where a
peek at the ultimate statutory question suggests an easy case, either for sustaining or
invalidating the agency action, then the difference between Chevron deference and
Skidmore deference makes no difference, and inefficient threshold litigation over
deference rules can be avoided.31 Yet this is at best a partial solution. Peeking at the
merits lower decision costs for judges, but parties must still invest in full argument of the
threshold issues, given the inevitable uncertainty about whether judges peeking at the
merits will find the issue sufficiently clear to pretermit the questions Mead makes
relevant. And a collateral cost of this Mead-avoidance strategy is to suppress the
development of precedent that might, over time, enable future courts to resolve the
threshold issues with increasing expedition.
2. Internal nondelegation—A notable recent proposal would reform Mead by
creating a “Chevron nondelegation doctrine,” changing the trigger for Chevron deference
from procedural formality to the identity of the official who acts for the agency.32 Agency
action would receive Chevron deference only if “a particular agency official—the official
Congress named in the relevant delegation—personally assumed responsibility for the
decision prior to issuance.”33 The idea is to design deference rules that promote political
accountability and disciplined policymaking.
This is a potentially important reframing of the Mead Court’s project, yet the
normative case for the proposal is undertheorized. The Chevron nondelegation doctrine
appeals to the same norm of political accountability that is said to underpin the
constitutional nondelegation doctrine; the former thus poses the same conundrums as the
latter. Delegation is just one of the myriad policy tools that legislators and agency heads
use. If ordinary politics is thought to generate a sufficient level of accountability to justify
the use of those other policy tools, why is a special constitutional rule needed for
delegation? After all, legislators and agency heads may be held accountable for the very
decision to make the delegation. The stock claim that delegatory decisions are less visible
to interest groups, concerned citizens and other outside monitors than are substantive
policy decisions lacks any empirical support, and overlooks that the technology of
monitoring is endogenous; in the long run, outsiders will not be consistently fooled by
resort to low-visibility delegation.34
The Chevron nondelegation doctrine, again like the constitutional nondelegation
doctrine, may be judicially unenforceable. Given the internal structure of agency
hierarchies, nothing will be easier than for agency heads to circumvent the rule,
delegating decisions de facto while retaining de jure authority; and reviewing judges will
be hard-pressed to discern when this has occurred. The authors of the proposal are quite
aware of this problem, and say that agency heads will often find it in their interest to
31
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decline to adopt a subordinate’s decision, even at the price of foregoing Chevron
deference, rather than rubberstamp a decision they have not actually reviewed.35 That
may well be so, but if true it merely suggests that the carrot of Chevron deference isn’t
very important to agencies in the first place; it is then unclear that either Mead or the
possible substitutes for Mead are worth worrying about. The authors have avoided the
enforceability problem only at the price of undermining the significance of their own
proposal. If, on the other hand, the value of obtaining Chevron deference is large enough
to provoke agency circumvention of the Chevron nondelegation doctrine, then the
proposal will require just as costly and unmanageable a judicial inquiry as the
excessively-refined Mead inquiry it is designed to replace.
3. Process both necessary and sufficient—A more obvious, but perhaps also more
manageable, proposal for reforming Mead would make the Court’s procedural-format test
a necessary condition for Chevron deference as well as a sufficient condition.36 Recall
that, under Mead, agency action by means of rulemaking or formal adjudication will
(almost) always receive deference, while informal action may or may not, depending on a
complex multifactor inquiry. This proposal would bar Chevron deference for agency
action outside the necessary formats. The proposal’s principal advantage is to drastically
reduce decision costs, relative to Mead’s complex structure.
The tradeoff here, however, is that reducing decision costs in this particular
fashion may sharply increase the rate of false negatives—the occasions on which no
Chevron deference is afforded to agency action which, under any plausible positive of
congressional intent or any plausible normative account of administrative
decisionmaking, ought to receive the greatest possible deference. “Several types of
binding rules may be issued without notice and comment, yet the Court would surely not
withhold Chevron deference from them—for example, rules relating to military or
foreign affairs functions, some procedural rules, and rules adopted summarily because of
urgency or some other ‘good cause’ for immediate action.”37 It probably seemed to the
Court that any test producing these results was unacceptable, far outside the feasible set
of candidate tests.
To be sure, although a more rigorous version of the format test would produce
false negatives, it is also true that Chevron produced false positives—occasions on which
Chevron would mandate agency deference, in circumstances that in the Court’s view did
not warrant deference. It is hard to say, in the abstract, which class of errors is larger, so
if we consider only the frequency of errors under the candidate tests it will be hard to
choose between them. But the gravity of the respective errors matters, as well as their
frequency. Where Chevron deference is afforded to informally produced rules, a
subsequent administration may reverse the agency’s decision, so any erroneous
interpretations that will prevail by reason of Chevron deference may later be corrected
without costly action by Congress. By contrast, where no Chevron deference is afforded
35
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to major binding rules adopted without notice and comment, such as military rules or
foreign-policy rules, the resulting judicial interpretation is treated as though inscribed in
the statute itself, and cannot be overturned by subsequent agency action in any procedural
format. If the judicial interpretation is erroneous, the only possible means to correct it is
new, more specific legislation. There is thus a profound asymmetry in the costs of
correcting the false positives produced by Chevron and the false negatives that the
rigorous format test would produce; so the latter errors are far more serious than the
former.
Back to the Future?
This view suggests that the best way to understand Mead might be as a failed
experiment. It was, ex ante, quite plausible to think that refining the Chevron test might
have produced appreciable improvements at little cost. Perhaps the Court saw Mead as a
small modification of the Chevron framework, mostly conceptual in character, and saw
Justice Scalia’s dissent, with its prophesies of disaster, as a wild overreaction. Nor can we
say, definitively, that the Mead experiment has yet failed. But the evidence to date of the
D.C. Circuit’s struggles with the doctrine is hardly cause for optimism. It supports a
different picture, one in which the Court has inadvertently sent the lower courts
stumbling into a no-man’s-land. We ought not condemn the experiment, but we ought to
condemn those who refuse to reverse it if and when it becomes clear that it has gone
badly wrong.
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